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I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 11, 2016, four individuals shut down the Enbridge oil 
pipelines running through Clearwater County.1 These four individuals 
traveled to the small town of Leonard, Minnesota, and cut their way into 
the valve station.2 Two of them accessed the shut-off valve, while one 
videotaped.3 The last individual contacted Enbridge, so the company had 
the opportunity to remotely shut down the pipelines.4 All four individuals 
were ultimately arrested and charged with felonies.5 
However, these four defendants did not enter the valve station and 
force the shutdown of the pipelines for their own benefit. Instead, they 
were engaged in an act of civil disobedience—they broke the law for a 
greater good6 by seeking to prevent the global harm caused by fossil fuels.7 
One of the defendants, Annette Klapstein explained, civil disobedience is 
“the only thing we have left as ordinary citizens when our political system 
will not respond to a crisis that is actually threatening the very existence of 
our grandchildren.”8 Despite this sincere belief, there are slim protections 
for people like Annette Klapstein who act on their convictions.9  
The Clearwater County defendants resorted to the protections 
afforded by the necessity defense.10 In Minnesota, the necessity defense is 
generally unavailable where there are alternative legal remedies, including 
access to the political system.11 The four Clearwater County defendants 
 
 1. State v. Klapstein, No. 15-CR-16-413, 2018 WL 1902473, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Apr. 23, 2018), cert. denied (July 17, 2018).  
 2. Id.  
 3. Id.  
 4. Id.  
 5. Id.  
 6. Dan Kraker, Trial Starts for Climate Protesters in Trump, Pipeline Country, 
MPR NEWS (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2018/10/08/trial-starts-for-
climate-protesters-in-trump-pipeline-country [https://perma.cc/E3Z2-Q8RM] [hereinafter 
Kraker, Pipeline Country]. 
 7. Klapstein, 2018 WL 1902473, at *1.  
 8. Elizabeth Dunbar, Minn. Court Sides with Climate Change Activists in Pipeline 
Case, MPR NEWS (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2018/04/23/appeals-
court-ruling-pipeline-protest-necessity-defense [https://perma.cc/L8Q6-KXUC]. 
 9. See  The Right to Protest, ACLU MINN. https://www.aclu-mn.org/en/know-your-
rights/right-protest [https://perma.cc/W7P4-PDGT] (discussing the scope and boundaries 
of civil disobedience). 
 10. Klapstein, 2018 WL 1902473, at *1.  
 11. State v. Rein, 477 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the 
necessity defense was unavailable where defendants “had access to the state legislature, 
courts, and law enforcement organizations”).  
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were fortunate in that the Minnesota Court of Appeals allowed them the 
opportunity to present their necessity defense, although the trial judge 
ultimately granted their motion for a judgment of acquittal before they had 
the opportunity to present the necessity defense in court.12 Nonetheless, 
the opportunity to present a necessity defense is exceedingly rare for acts 
of civil disobedience.13  
Those who commit genuine acts of civil disobedience deserve more 
protection than the meager options currently available. Civil disobedience 
must be recognized as an appropriate means of engaging in the 
constitutionally protected expression of political dissent. Individuals who 
engage in valid acts of disobedience must be permitted to assert civil 
disobedience as a defense to reduce the punishment they receive for 
expressing political dissent through communicative acts. Embracing such a 
use of civil disobedience would not eliminate a criminal conviction, but 
would instead reduce a convicted defendant’s punishment.14 This method 
thus demonstrates respect not only for the rule of law, but also for the 
important place civil disobedience holds in society.  
In Part II, this note provide the theoretical basis for a judicially 
manageable definition of civil disobedience: namely, that a valid act of civil 
disobedience exists where there is an unjust government act that 
necessitates active disobedience.15 Part III provides support for the 
protection of active political dissent from Supreme Court decisions 
regarding the First Amendment, draft evasion, and the civil rights 
movement.16 Part IV describes how civil disobedience, as a means to 
reduce sentencing, does not run afoul of established notions of criminal 
 
 12. See Klapstein, 2018 WL 1902473, at *1; see also Dunbar, supra note 8; Dan 
Kraker, Surprise Acquittal in Enbridge Pipeline Protesters’ Case, MPR NEWS (Oct. 9, 
2018), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2018/10/09/judge-acquits-enbridge-pipeline-
protesters [https://perma.cc/8G2D-SUX9].  
 13. See Dunbar, supra note 8 (noting that this was not the first time a judge allowed 
the necessity defense for climate change protests, but only providing two other examples of 
such a result); see also William P. Quigley, The Necessity Defense in Civil Disobedience 
Cases: Bring in the Jury, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 3, 27–37 (2003) (reviewing the application 
of the necessity defense in civil disobedience cases and finding twenty-three examples of 
juries in state courts acquitting defendants asserting the necessity defense for acts of civil 
disobedience).  
 14. See Daniel M. Farrell, Paying the Penalty: Justifiable Civil Disobedience and the 
Problem of Punishment, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 165, 166 (1977) (“[T]he case for punishing 
 justifiable civil disobedience is not as strong as is often thought.”). 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
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intent.17 It also discusses civil disobedience as a viable alternative to the 
necessity defense.18 Lastly, Part V uses the Clearwater County case as a 
practical example of how civil disobedience may be asserted.19 In sum, this 
note provides support for the notion that a person who violated a 
government act—one that a reasonable person would find to be unjust and 
that necessitated direct action to end that injustice—should be allowed to 
present a defense arguing for reduced or nominal punishment. 
II. THEORETICAL CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE  
Civil disobedience is an active means of resisting the government 
through disobeying or impeding some kind of government action.20 Some 
commentators have posited that its “distinguishing characteristic” is 
resistance, through disobedience, “against a specific law or act of the State 
having the effect of law.”21 Throughout the nation’s history, additional 
attempts to define civil disobedience have resulted in several unwieldy 
factors and characteristics.22 A review of the theoretical underpinnings of 
 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. See infra Part IV.  
 19. See infra Part V.  
 20. See Quigley, supra note 13, at 14–15 (“Civil disobedience is the intentional 
violation of a law for reasons of principle, conscience or social change.”). 
 21. Harrop A. Freeman, The Right of Protest and Civil Disobedience, 41 IND. L.J. 
228, 231 (1966). 
 22. See id. Freeman posits seven additional defining characteristics of civil 
disobedience: 
 (1) “Civil” is not used in contradistinction to “criminal” (for some civil 
disobedience is indicted as criminal), but it is used as “against the state, the civil, 
the civitas;” (2) it is an “intentional” act, a chosen course, not occasioned by 
accident; (3) it is used for an external purpose (to call attention to injustice, to 
change conditions); (4) it is non-violent, at least in origin; (5) it is a form of 
communication and asserts that it is within the theory of the first amendment; (6) 
it is used by those who are in fact barred from otherwise exerting power; (7) it 
may be legal or illegal.  
Id. at 231–32; see also Matthew R. Hall, Guilty but Civilly Disobedient: Reconciling Civil 
Disobedience and the Rule of Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2083, 2087–92 (positing that the 
elements of civil disobedience are that it is (1) political, (2) conscientious, (3) nonviolent 
and respectful, (4) requires acceptance of punishment, and (5) must “take place publicly or 
openly”); Quigley, supra note 13, at 14 (“Civil disobedience is an act of protest, deliberately 
unlawful, conscientiously and publicly performed. It may have as its object the laws or 
policies of some governmental body, or those of some private corporate body whose 
decisions have serious public consequences; but in either case the disobedient protest is 
almost invariably nonviolent in character.”). 
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civil disobedience, however, reveals a simpler test for determining what is, 
and what is not, civil disobedience.  
Theorists have given civil disobedience and related concepts 
substantial consideration throughout human history.23 There are, however, 
several theorists who are particularly important to this discussion. The first 
is Saint Thomas Aquinas, as his work, Summa Theologica, is one of the 
earliest instances of advocating for the justified and principled refusal to 
follow the laws.24 The second is Henry David Thoreau, whose essay Civil 
Disobedience was among the first to discuss civil disobedience in the 
American context.25 The third theorist is Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 
whose Letter from Birmingham Jail is a uniquely forceful endorsement of 
civil disobedience in the context of segregation and the Civil Rights Era.26 
These three works reveal a manageable and concise test for determining 
what is a valid act of civil disobedience: actions taken in the face of a 
government act that is unjust and necessitates active disobedience. 
 
 23. Freeman, supra note 21, at 237–38. Freeman notes that historically, the theory of 
civil disobedience has been couched in ideas of natural or divine law:  
When Antigone insisted upon burying her brother despite the king’s edict that 
his body be cast to the dogs; when Christians refused to pay homage to 
Caesar’s image with incense and wine; when Aquinas insisted that “human law 
does not bind a man in conscience . . . [and if they conflict] human law should 
not be obeyed;” when the American colonies declared their independence of 
England because “all men are created equal, [that they are] endowed by their 
Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and 
the pursuit of Happiness;” . . . they relied upon a higher law, a natural justice, 
a code of man’s fundamental rights which no political power can eliminate. 
Id.  
 24. See Summa Theologica, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Summa-theologiae [https://perma.cc/2AAP-HHDD] 
(noting that Summa Theologica was written between 1265 and 1273 AD); see also Ryan 
Reeves, The Significance of 
Thomas Aquinas, LIGONIER MINISTRIES (Sept. 1, 2013), https://www.ligonier.org/learn/arti
cles/significance-thomas-aquinas/ [https://perma.cc/M8NH-AYFA] (describing the Summa 
Theologica as “a work that is unrivaled in its scope, covering a staggering number of 
subjects” including “the function of civil government”). 
 25. See Thoreau and “Civil Disobedience,” CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUND., 
http://www.crf-usa.org/black-history-month/thoreau-and-civil-disobedience 
[https://perma.cc/387S-B7JH].  
 26. See Jack Brymer, MLK’s ‘Letter from Birmingham Jail’ Called Most Important 
Document of Civil Rights Era, SAMFORD UNIV. (Apr. 17, 2014), 
https://www.samford.edu/news/2013/MLKs-Letter-from-Birmingham-Jail-Called-Most-
important-Document-of-Civil-Rights-Era [https://perma.cc/7RKY-5TGQ] (noting that the 
“basic themes of Dr. King’s letter” were “justification, non-violence, timing, breaking laws 
and extremism”). 
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Accordingly, the constituent elements of civil disobedience should be (1) a 
government act,27 (2) that is unjust,28 and (3) that necessitates active 
disobedience.29  
A. An Act of Government  
The first requirement of civil disobedience is that there be a 
governmental act to disobey. In Summa Theologica, Saint Thomas 
Aquinas is concerned with governmental acts constituting what he calls 
“human law.”30 According to Aquinas, proper human law must be derived 
from natural or divine law.31 A purely human law, however, is a 
“determination of certain generalities” from the natural law.32 By way of 
example, Aquinas offers that if the “law of nature has it that the evil-doer 
should be punished,” the purely human law derived from this generality 
would be how the evil-doer is punished “in this or that way.”33 Aquinas 
further notes that “those things which are” derived from generalities “have 
no other force than that of human law.”34 In short, human law constitutes a 
governmental act when it is drawn solely from human reasoning and not 
implemented directly from religious doctrine.35 
 
 27. See infra Section II.A. 
 28. See infra Section II.B. 
 29. See infra Section II.C. 
 30. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1356 (Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. ed. 1947) 
https://www.basilica.ca/documents/2016/10/St.%20Thomas%20Aquinas-
Summa%20Theologica.pdf [https://perma.cc/7X5D-8JMP]. 
 31. Id. at 1358. 
 32. Id. This is opposed to a human law that also has the force of natural law. Aquinas 
notes that human laws may be derived by “demonstrated conclusions” that “are drawn 
from the principles.” Aquinas expounds on this notion by noting that “[s]ome things are 
therefore derived from the general principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions; e.g. 
that ‘one must not kill’ may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that ‘one should 
do harm to no man.’” Id. Aquinas concludes that “those things which are derived” from 
conclusions “are contained in human law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have 
some force from the natural law also.” Id. Because Aquinas’s theory on what makes a law 
just includes the force of natural law, I am not further concerned with laws Aquinas 
determines to be created from conclusions. See id. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. See id. This references the distinction, as Aquinas would see it, between directly 
implementing the Ten Commandments and implementing laws that have the effect of 
advancing the precepts in the Ten Commandments. Instead of directly borrowing the 
commandment not to kill, a “human law” would be the distinctions in homicide society is 
familiar with, such as differentiating between manslaughter and first-degree murder.  
6
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Thoreau expands this concept of the governmental act beyond 
simply the laws humans make, and he takes issue with the functions of the 
government beyond its legislative power. The two main actions Thoreau 
condemns are the large topics of his day: tolerance of slavery and the 
Mexican-American War.36  
Thoreau condemns no single legislative act. Instead, he condemns 
government actions which are beyond the reach of the average voter or 
legislator, namely the “character and measures of a government” on the 
most divisive issues of one’s time.37 Thoreau’s condemnation of 
overarching government stances is exemplified by his general disdain for 
democratic means of change, as he declares that “[e]ven voting . . . is doing 
nothing.”38 This concept is further reinforced by how he describes his 
yearly process of evaluating the government: “[E]ach year . . . I find myself 
disposed to review the acts and position of the general and State 
governments, and the spirit of the people, to discover a pretext for 
conformity.”39 Thoreau’s analysis of the governmental act therefore 
considers not only the “acts” of the government, but also the general 
“position” of those governments and even the “spirit of the people.” His 
conception of the governmental act is clearly a much broader analysis than 
the laws that humans create, including the stances the government takes on 
the seminal issues of its time.  
The concept of the governmental act, as formulated by Dr. King, is 
the culmination of Aquinas’s focus on law itself and Thoreau’s expanded 
inquiry. Dr. King is dedicated to opposing and ending laws that create and 
enforce segregation.40 However, Dr. King also decries the democratic 
system that allowed those laws to be created:  
 
 36. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN AND “CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE” 264–65 (Signet 
Classics ed., New American Library 2012) (1849). Thoreau’s frustration with the country 
on both of these issues is evident: 
In other words, when a sixth of the population of a nation which has 
undertaken to be the refuge of liberty are slaves, and a whole country is 
unjustly overrun and conquered by a foreign army, and subjected to military 
law, I think that it is not too soon for honest men to rebel and revolutionize. 
What makes this duty the more urgent is the fact that the country so overrun is 
not out own, but ours is the invading army. 
Id. 
 37. See id. at 268. 
 38. Id. at 266.  
 39. Id. at 279.  
 40. Martin Luther King Jr.’s ‘Letter from Birmingham Jail’, ATLANTIC, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/02/letter-from-birmingham-jail/552461/ 
[https://perma.cc/6VP6-ZW6Q] [hereinafter Letter from Birmingham Jail]. 
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Who can say that the legislature of Alabama which set up that 
state’s segregation laws was democratically elected? Throughout 
Alabama all sorts of devious methods are used to prevent 
Negroes from becoming registered voters, and there are some 
counties in which, even though Negroes constitute a majority of 
the population, not a single Negro is registered. Can any law 
enacted under such circumstances be considered democratically 
structured?41 
Dr. King also denounces the police forces that enforce the laws 
created by a broken democratic system:  
I doubt that you would so quickly commend the policemen if 
you were to observe their ugly and inhumane treatment of 
Negroes here in the city jail; if you were to watch them push and 
curse old Negro women and young Negro girls; if you were to 
see them slap and kick old Negro men and young boys; if you 
were to observe them, as they did on two occasions, refuse to 
give us food because we wanted to sing our grace together. I 
cannot join you in your praise of the Birmingham police 
department.42 
Dr. King is, therefore, not merely concerned with the laws, nor even 
with the stances of the general government—he is concerned with the 
dysfunctional democratic process that creates the laws and government’s 
enforcement of those laws. Dr. King’s conception of the government 
action, as it relates to civil disobedience, is thus focused on the laws, the 
system from which the laws are created, and how those laws are enforced. 
The first element of civil disobedience may therefore be defined as 
follows: a government act may include the laws, the system by which those 
laws are created, how those laws are enforced, and the general stances of 
the government enforcing those laws.43  
 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. This passage is in response to the white church leaders from the South who 
wrote a letter condemning Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “extremism” while praising the 
Birmingham police for keeping order.  
 43. Examples of this definition in action include positions the government takes on 
certain stances (such as slavery or segregation), the constitution by which the government is 
organized (which originally allowed slavery), the common law that perpetuates unjust 
government actions (decisions that advance unjust aspects of the Constitution), and the 
system that enforces statutes or the common law derived from the Constitution (such as the 
police or the democratic system that may perpetuate unjust aspects of the Constitution). 
8
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B. That is Unjust 
The second element of civil disobedience is that the government act 
is unjust. The main issue that Aquinas, Thoreau, and Dr. King consider in 
this context is how to determine when a government action is unjust.  
Aquinas acknowledges that human law has the capacity to be unjust. 
According to him, “a thing is said to be just . . . according to the rule of 
reason.”44 However, “the first rule of reason is the law of nature.”45 Thus, 
just laws must not obstruct natural law, for if “in any point [human law] 
deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of 
law.”46 
Aquinas further postulates that laws are just if “they have the power of 
binding in conscience.”47 For a law to have the power to bind one’s 
conscience, it must be “ordained to the common good,” which has two 
constituent parts: (1) the law does not exceed the power of the law-giver to 
create it, and (2) it is proportional to the “good” sought to be achieved.48 A 
just law is thus one that is based in natural law and has the power of 
conscience; namely, that it is made in the common good and its burdens 
are proportional to that interest.  
Aquinas more clearly delineates this principle by noting that laws may 
be unjust: unjust laws are contrary to the “human good” or to the “Divine 
good.”49 Most importantly, Aquinas notes that laws inimical to the human 
good are those that are “burdensome” and “not to the common good,” 
exceed the lawgiver’s authority, or “are imposed unequally on the 
 
 44. AQUINAS, supra note 30, at 1358. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 1365. 
 48. Id. Aquinas more fully expounds on the notion of the common good in saying 
that:  
[L]aws are said to be just, both from the end, when, to wit, they are ordained 
to the common good—-and from their author, that is to say, when the law that 
is made does not exceed the power of the lawgiver—-and from their form, 
when, to wit, burdens are laid on the subjects, according to an equality of 
proportion and with a view to the common good. For, since one man is a part 
of the community, each man in all that he is and has, belongs to the 
community; just as a part, in all that it is, belongs to the whole; wherefore 
nature inflicts a loss on the part, in order to save the whole: so that on this 
account, such laws as these, which impose proportionate burdens, are just and 
binding in conscience, and are legal laws. 
Id.  
 49. Id. at 1365–66.  
9
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community.”50 He calls such laws “acts of violence rather than laws.”51 
Therefore, according to Aquinas, laws are just when they have the support 
of conscience; that is to say, when they are properly enacted by the 
authority and proportional to the needs of the common good, with their 
burdens equally borne by the community under the authority’s 
jurisdiction. 
Thoreau’s conception of a “just” government action has a similar 
focus on conscience. Thoreau rejects the notion that majority rule in a 
democratic system inherently creates a just government.52 Instead, 
Thoreau posits that “we should be men first, and subjects afterward.”53 
This means we should not “cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for 
the right.”54 Thoreau thus declares that “[t]he only obligation which I have 
a right to assume, is to do at any time what I think right.”55 Thoreau’s 
concept of a “just” government action, therefore, springs from an intrinsic 
notion of what is right and what is wrong.  
Thoreau’s views of punishment support this notion of individual, 
conscientious determinations of what is just. As he was resting in prison for 
his own act of civil disobedience,56 he observed that the state had “resolved 
to punish my body” because “they could not reach me.”57 Because the 
state could not punish his conscience, it resorted to punishing his body. 
He emphasizes this point when he posits that “the State never intentionally 
confronts a man’s sense, intellectual or moral, but only his body, his 
senses.”58 Thoreau’s conception of what makes a government act unjust 
thus involves a person’s “intellectual” and “moral” conception of what is 
right and wrong.59  
 
 50. Id. at 1365. 
 51. Id. Aquinas observes that laws are contrary to the “Divine good” when they are 
“the laws of tyrants inducing to idolatry, or to anything else contrary to the Divine law.” Id. 
at 1366.  
 52. THOREAU, supra note 36, at 262. Thoreau observes that “a government in which 
the majority rule in all cases cannot be based on justice.” Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 263. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Thoreau did not pay his poll tax for six years and spent one night in jail because 
of it. Id. at 274. 
 57. Id. (emphasis added).  
 58. Id.  
 59. Thoreau’s concept of individual conscience as an element of what makes a law 
unjust is prevalent as much in the government actions that he doesn’t oppose as from those 
he does. Thoreau did not pay his poll tax because he did not support the government’s 
stances on slavery and the Mexican-American War. See id. at 274. However, Thoreau also 
10
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According to Thoreau, what makes a government act unjust, 
however, is not limited to an individual belief as to what is right. It also 
includes the notion that a government action is unjust if it causes a person 
to violate what they believe is right. Thoreau declares that if a government 
edict “is of such a nature that it requires [a person] to be the agent of 
injustice to another, then, I say, break the law.”60 A government act must 
work injustice on another in order to be unjust, in addition to being 
contrary to a person’s intrinsic sense of right and wrong. In other words, 
Thoreau’s criteria for what makes a law unjust is that it is contrary to an 
intrinsic sense of right and wrong (and thus violates a person’s conscience), 
and that it serves to work injustice on another. 
Dr. King’s criteria for what makes a government act unjust follows in 
the steps of both Aquinas and Thoreau in two ways: first, it involves one’s 
conscience, and second, the injustice is imposed on another by operation 
of the act. Dr. King acknowledges the aspect of conscience when he notes 
that “one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws.”61 Dr. King 
explains, “[a] just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law 
or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the 
moral law.”62 
But Dr. King goes beyond a mere moral requirement for a 
government act to be just; a just government action also must respect the 
personhood of those it affects.63 Dr. King states that “[a]ny law that uplifts 
 
notes that he has “never declined paying the highway tax” because he is “as desirous of 
being a good neighbor” as he is “of being a bad subject.” Id. at 278. Thoreau also supports 
the schools, because he is “doing [his] part to educate [his] fellow-countrymen.” Id. As 
these taxes do not violate Thoreau’s conscience, or at least do not as directly support the 
government and its initiatives, Thoreau does not find them to be unjust.  
 60. Id. at 269.  
 61. Letter from Birmingham Jail, supra note 40.  
 62. Id. Dr. King also directly cites Aquinas as his inspiration for this moral element of 
just laws: “[t]o put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law is a human law that 
is not rooted in eternal law and natural law.” Id.  
 63. Dr. King is perhaps aware that a mere moral justification for his actions is 
insufficient to justify those actions to the American public; sections of the American public 
regarded Dr. King as a hypocrite, picking and choosing the laws he implored Americans to 
follow. Dr. King responds to this criticism directly, not only with his principled approach to 
determining what makes a law unjust, but also with the following passage: 
You express a great deal of anxiety over our willingness to break laws. This is 
certainly a legitimate concern. Since we so diligently urge people to obey the 
Supreme Court’s decision of 1954 outlawing segregation in the public schools, 
at first glance it may seem rather paradoxical for us consciously to break laws. 
One may well ask: “How can you advocate breaking some laws and obeying 
11
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human personality is just. Any law that degrades human personality is 
unjust.”64 Dr. King uses the word “personality” to describe the notion that 
unjust government actions reduce the personhood of those they affect.65 
This is evident by Dr. King’s further determination that segregation laws 
give “the segregator a false sense of superiority and the segregated a false 
sense of inferiority,” and that segregation laws end up “relegating persons 
to the status of things.”66 Dr. King, therefore requires that unjust 
government actions must not only be morally reprehensible, but must also 
negatively impact the personhood of those the actions are targeted 
toward.67 
Dr. King provides several examples of this definition in action. First, 
he applies this definition to laws themselves when he offers that “[a]n 
unjust law is a code that a numerical or power majority group compels a 
minority group to obey but does not make binding on itself. This is 
difference made legal.”68 Next, Dr. King applies this definition to his 
notion that a system of government itself may be considered a 
governmental act in observing that “[a] law is unjust if it is inflicted on a 
minority that, as a result of being denied the right to vote, had no part in 
enacting or devising the law.”69 Thus, the system of creating laws is unjust if 
it accepts and endorses hierarchies among the constituency. Therefore, a 
democratic society is unjust when it does not allow a portion of its 
members access to the democratic process.  
 
others?” The answer lies in the fact that there are two types of laws: just and 
unjust. I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws. 
Id.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. Dr. King also seems to be drawing on Chief Justice Earl Warren’s theory of 
inferiority-as-harm in and of itself: “[t]o separate [children in grade and high school] from 
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of 
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a 
way unlikely ever to be undone.” Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) 
(invalidating the doctrine of separate but equal as it applies to segregated schools).  
 67. This comports with Aquinas’s observation that unjust laws will be “imposed 
unequally on the community,” for if laws are imposed unequally, they inherently 
differentiate between those who are superior to the law and so inferior as to be under its 
heel. See AQUINAS, supra note 30, at 1365. This also comports with Thoreau’s concept of 
a government action being unjust when it causes an injustice on another, as he recognizes 
the government actions he complains of as wronging entire races. See THOREAU, supra 
note 36, at 271 (stating that prisons are where “the fugitive slave, and the Mexican prisoner 
on parole, and the Indian come to plead the wrongs of his race”). 
 68. Letter from Birmingham Jail, supra note 40.  
 69. Id.  
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Lastly, Dr. King applies his definition of “unjust” to his notion of 
enforcement of laws as government actions. He states that a law may be 
“just on its face and unjust in its application.”70 Dr. King illustrates this 
concept by presenting an example from his personal life when he was 
arrested for “parading without a permit.”71 An ordinance requiring a 
permit for a parade is acceptable on its face, but “becomes unjust when it 
is used to maintain segregation and to deny citizens the First-Amendment 
privilege of peaceful assembly and protest.”72 Thus, enforcing facially 
neutral laws becomes unjust when done to reinforce a system that accepts 
inferiority among its citizens. 
 Accordingly, the second element of civil disobedience may be 
defined as follows: a government act is unjust when (1) it violates the 
conscience of an individual, and (2) it has the effect of harming those it is 
applied against.  
C. That Necessitates Active Disobedience 
The third element of civil disobedience is that the unjust government 
act makes active disobedience necessary. This element has two subparts: 
(1) the disobedience must be active,73 and (2) the disobedience must be 
necessary. 
Aquinas contemplates the issue of necessity by observing that “it 
happens often that the observance of some point of law conduces to the 
common weal in the majority of instances, and yet, in some cases, is very 
hurtful.”74 In these instances, a person is justified in acting “contrary to the 
letter of the law, in order to maintain the common weal.”75 The “common 
 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id.  
 72. Id.  
 73. “Active” disobedience, as opposed to “passive” disobedience, is not to be 
confused with the distinction often made between “direct” and “indirect” disobedience. See 
Quigley, supra note 13, at 17 (“Direct civil disobedience can be defined as the intentional 
violation of the specific law targeted for challenge . . . [i]ndirect civil disobedience can be 
defined as the violation of a law which itself is not sought to be changed.”). Instead, as 
outlined more fully below, “active” disobedience means any act through which one 
disobeys the unjust government act, with no distinction made for whether that act itself is 
“direct” or “indirect.” 
 74. AQUINAS, supra note 30, at 1368. This mirrors Dr. King’s observation that a law 
may be just on its face but unjust in its application. See Letter from Birmingham Jail, supra 
note 40.  
 75. AQUINAS, supra note 30, at 1368.  
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weal” is simply another term for the common good.76 Aquinas is thus 
embracing the principle that even if a law is in the common interest, 
disobedience is valid when it becomes harmful.77  
Aquinas further embraces the principle that disobeying laws may be 
necessary. He notes that if “the peril be so sudden as not to allow of the 
delay involved by referring the matter to authority, the mere necessity 
brings with it a dispensation, since necessity knows no law.”78 This is in 
contrast to instances that do “not involve any sudden risk needing instant 
remedy,” where the ordinary citizen is “not competent” to “expound what 
is useful and what is not useful to the state.”79 According to Aquinas, 
therefore, disobedience is necessary when an ordinarily useful law is 
harmful to others and petition to the law-making authority to change the 
law is useless or unavailable.  
Thoreau contemplates that disobedience must take the form of active 
disobedience. He is contemptuous of the notion that effective change will 
come through the democratic process.80 Instead, Thoreau states that 
“[u]njust laws exist,” and asks, “shall we be content to obey them, or shall 
we endeavor to amend them, and obey them until we have succeeded, or 
shall we transgress them at once?”81 Thoreau is clearly on the side of 
immediate and active transgression.  
 
 76. The Common Weal, COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/the-common-weal 
[https://perma.cc/2YHC-M5AZ] (defining “the common weal” as “the good of society”). 
 77. See AQUINAS, supra note 30, at 1368. The example of such an instance that 
Aquinas offers is that of a city under siege: 
For instance, suppose that in a besieged city it be an established law that the 
gates of the city are to be kept closed, this is good for public welfare as a 
general rule: but, it were to happen that the enemy are in pursuit of certain 
citizens, who are defenders of the city, it would be a great loss to the city, if the 
gates were not opened to them: and so in that case the gates ought to be 
opened, contrary to the letter of the law, in order to maintain the common 
weal. 
Id. Note particularly that Aquinas does not contemplate that the lawgiver must approve 
opening the gates; the citizens should do so of their own volition. See id. 
 78. Id. (emphasis added). 
 79. Id.  
 80. THOREAU, supra note 36, at 261 (stating that “[t]he government itself, which is 
only the mode which the people have chosen to execute their will, is equally liable to be 
abused and perverted before the people can act through it”). Thoreau also condemns the 
“thousands who are in opinion opposed to slavery and to the war, who yet in effect do 
nothing to put an end to them,” saying that “[a] wise man will not leave the right to the 
mercy of chance, nor wish it to prevail through the power of the majority.” Id. at 266.  
 81. Id. at 269.  
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Thoreau declares that “[a]ction from principle . . . changes things and 
relations.”82 This stems from “the right to refuse allegiance to and to resist, 
the government, when its tyranny or its inefficiency are great and 
unendurable.”83 In these circumstances, “a people, as well as an individual, 
must do justice, cost what it may.”84 To do justice, Thoreau states that a 
person must “cast [their] whole vote, not a strip of paper merely, but 
[their] whole influence,” noting that even a minority “is irresistible” when 
every member casts their “whole weight.”85 This is further reinforced by 
Thoreau’s proclamation that  
I know this well, that if one thousand, if one hundred, if ten 
men whom I could name, if ten honest men only, ay, if one 
HONEST man, in this State of Massachusetts, ceasing to hold 
slaves, were actually to withdraw from this copartnership, and be 
locked up in the county jail therefor, it would be the abolition of 
slavery in America. For it matters not how small the beginning 
may seem to be: what is once well done is done for ever.86 
Thoreau therefore advocates for active disobedience based on a 
person’s conscience. 
Thoreau also believes that this sort of active disobedience is 
necessary when the government’s actions threaten the status of its people. 
His main complaints are that his government’s support of slavery and of 
the war in Mexico is unjust, which threatens the status of not only those 
who are slaves but, also the status of America in the eyes of the world. 
Thoreau notes, “If we were left solely to the wordy wit of legislators in 
Congress for our guidance . . . America would not long retain her rank 
 
 82. Id. at 268. 
 83. Id. at 264.  
 84. Id. at 265 (emphasis added). Doing justice for Thoreau meant that “[t]his people 
must cease to hold slaves, and to make war on Mexico, though it cost them their existence 
as a people.” Id.  
 85. Id. at 271.  
 86. Id. at 270–71. Thoreau is perhaps even more forceful in advocating for direct 
action from the community of abolitionists: 
I do not hesitate to say, that those who call themselves Abolitionists should at 
once effectually withdraw their support, both in person and property, from the 
government of Massachusetts, and not wait till they constitute a majority of 
one, before they suffer the right to prevail through them. I think that it is 
enough if they have God on their side, without waiting for that other one. 
Moreover, any man more right than his neighbors constitutes a majority of one 
already. 
Id. at 270. 
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among the nations.”87 The means to correct these injustices are in the form 
of “the seasonable experience and the effectual complaints of the 
people.”88 For Thoreau active disobedience is necessary to overcome the 
complacent majoritarian will that creates unjust government actions.  
Dr. King’s conception of active disobedience is similarly rooted in 
notions of injustice and systemic change. He is acutely aware that “it is a[] 
historical fact that privileged groups seldom give up their privileges 
voluntarily.”89 Dr. King notes that, while individual persons are more likely 
to “see the moral light and voluntarily give up their unjust posture . . . , 
groups tend to be more immoral than individuals.”90 This is to say that the 
systems in which we live are less amenable to change than the people that 
live in these systems. It is also a reflection of Dr. King’s notion that 
governmental systems themselves may be the governmental act that civil 
disobedience seeks to remedy. To affect these systems, “freedom . . . must 
be demanded by the oppressed.”91 
Dr. King’s means of demanding freedom is what he calls “nonviolent 
direct action.”92 In Dr. King’s day, this included “sit-ins, marches[,] and so 
forth.”93 The purpose of “direct action” is to force the governing powers 
into negotiation.94 Dr. King says that “[n]onviolent direct action seeks to 
create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has 
constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue.”95 He thus 
removes the act of disobedience from the context of the specific law it is 
directed against, and he places it in the context of actively seeking systemic 
change.96 This is clear from his admonition that “an individual who breaks 
 
 87. Id. at 282.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Letter from Birmingham Jail, supra note 40.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. Dr. King responds to his critics by saying “[y]ou are quite right in calling for 
negotiation. Indeed, this is the very purpose of direct action.” Id.  
 95. Id. Instead of avoiding tension, Dr. King advocates that “a type of constructive, 
nonviolent tension,” that is “necessary for growth.” Id.  
 96. Id. Dr. King notes that this conception of civil disobedience is firmly rooted in 
the traditions of history, faith, and our nation: 
Of course, there is nothing new about this kind of civil disobedience. It was 
evidenced sublimely in the refusal of Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego to 
obey the laws of Nebuchadnezzar, on the ground that a higher moral law was 
at stake. It was practiced superbly by the early Christians, who were willing to 
face hungry lions and the excruciating pain of chopping blocks rather than 
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a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and who willingly accepts the 
penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the 
community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for 
law.”97 For Dr. King, therefore, active disobedience is proper when it is 
aimed at correcting systemic injustices. 
Furthermore, Dr. King asserts that active disobedience is necessary 
because governmental and social systems do not change on their own. He 
is frustrated by constant admonitions that all he needs to do is wait for the 
injustice to correct itself.98 In Dr. King’s experience, “‘[w]ait’ has almost 
always meant ‘[n]ever.’”99 For this reason, he chafes at the inactivity of the 
“white moderate, who is more devoted to ‘order’ than to justice,” who 
agrees with “the goal,” but does not agree with the “methods of direct 
action.”100 Dr. King, understanding that “law and order exist for the 
 
submit to certain unjust laws of the Roman Empire. To a degree, academic 
freedom is a reality today because Socrates practiced civil disobedience. In our 
own nation, the Boston Tea Party represented a massive act of civil 
disobedience.  
Id.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. Dr. King responds to this argument forcefully and eloquently: 
We have waited for more than 340 years for our constitutional and God-given 
rights. The nations of Asia and Africa are moving with jetlike speed toward 
gaining political independence, but we still creep at horse-and-buggy pace 
toward gaining a cup of coffee at a lunch counter. Perhaps it is easy for those 
who have never felt the stinging darts of segregation to say, “Wait.” But when 
you have seen vicious mobs lynch your mothers and fathers at will and drown 
your sisters and brothers at whim; when you have seen hate-filled policemen 
curse, kick and even kill your black brothers and sisters; when you see the vast 
majority of your twenty million Negro brothers smothering in an airtight cage 
of poverty in the midst of an affluent society . . . when you are forever fighting 
a degenerating sense of “nobodiness”—then you will understand why we find it 
difficult to wait. There comes a time when the cup of endurance runs over, 
and men are no longer willing to be plunged into the abyss of despair. I hope, 
sirs, you can understand our legitimate and unavoidable impatience. 
Id.  
 99. Id. Dr. King also notes the halting progress made by voluntary promises to 
change. In the September before Dr. King wrote his letter, he spoke with “leaders of 
Birmingham’s economic community,” who promised “to remove the stores’ humiliating 
racial signs,” among other measures. Id. Dr. King observes that “[a]s the weeks and months 
went by, we realized that we were the victims of a broken promise. A few signs, briefly 
removed, returned; the others remained.” Id.  
 100. Id. Thoreau raises a similar complaint with the complacency of his countrymen, 
noting that “[t]hose who, while they disapprove of the character and measures of a 
government, yield to it their allegiance and support, are undoubtedly its most conscientious 
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purpose of establishing justice,” declares that those who fail to correct law 
and order when it is unjust “become the dangerously structured dams that 
block the flow of social progress.”101 Active disobedience is necessary, 
therefore, to create the tension that forces the intransigent to participate in 
reform.  
Thus, the third element of civil disobedience is: the unjust 
government act makes active disobedience necessary. Civil disobedience is 
necessary when the governmental acts cause harm and formal redress is 
unavailable, often because the system that created the injustice may not be 
trusted to effect change of its own volition. 
D. The Constituent Elements of Civil Disobedience 
Civil disobedience is justified when (1) there is a government action,102 
(2) that is unjust,103 and (3) that necessitates active disobedience.104 
“Government action” may include the laws, the system by which those 
laws are created, how those laws are enforced, and the general stances of 
the government enforcing the laws. Government acts are unjust when (1) 
they violate the individual’s conscience, and (2) harm those they are 
applied against. Government acts necessitate active disobedience to cause 
change when the governmental acts cause harm and formal redress is 
unavailable, usually because the system that created the harmful 
governmental act will not make the change on its own. 
This is the formation of civil disobedience that will guide the rest of 
this analysis and will be used as basis for a constitutionally protected 
defense. However, it is pertinent to reiterate that this definition of civil 
disobedience would not allow a criminal defendant to argue for acquittal, 
but instead it would only allow a criminal defendant to argue for a reduced 
sentence.  
III. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND THE SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court has not recognized civil disobedience as a stand-
alone, constitutionally recognized right or as an independent criminal 
defense. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recognized that individuals 
 
supporters, and so frequently the most serious obstacles to reform.” THOREAU, supra note 
36, at 268.  
 101. Letter from Birmingham Jail, supra note 40. 
 102. See supra Part II.A. 
 103. See supra Part II.B. 
 104. See supra Part II.C. 
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do have a right to express their dissent and the government may not tell 
them how they are allowed to do so. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these 
principles are recognized through First Amendment jurisprudence and 
come from cases arising out of draft evasion and the civil rights movement. 
A. The First Amendment and Expressing Dissent 
The Supreme Court has a long history of recognizing that freedom of 
speech is essential for an ordered system of government.105 This history 
arises from the idea that the founders of the nation “believed that freedom 
to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to 
the discovery and spread of political truth.”106 In 1927, Justice Brandeis 
espoused that freedom of speech and expression is essential for our 
system of government to succeed because it is the most reliable means of 
reaching political truth, and that this freedom is essential to prevent “the 
occasional tyrannies of governing majorities.”107 Civil disobedience, as 
 
 105. While this concept arose earlier, it received its most notable exposition in Justice 
Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927). One of 
the most famous recent cases that reaffirms this concept is Citizens United v. FEC, 558 
U.S. 310 (2010) (affirming freedom of political expression for corporate entities).  
 106. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
 107. See id. at 375–76. The full quote from Justice Brandeis’s opinion is even more 
forceful: 
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was 
to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the 
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both 
as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to [be] the secret of happiness 
and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as 
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery 
and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion 
would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate 
protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest 
menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; 
and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. 
They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they 
knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its 
infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; 
that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces 
stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss 
freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy 
for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied 
through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument 
of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing 
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formulated here, arises out of these “occasional tyrannies” and is an 
alternative means to act against them.108 
Since Justice Brandeis articulated this principle, the Supreme Court 
has consistently recognized that a function of the First Amendment is to 
protect political dissent.109 In 1949, the Supreme Court stated that “a 
function of free speech under our system of government is to invite 
dispute,” and that free speech may “best serve its high purpose when it 
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as 
they are, or even stirs people to anger.”110 For speech to serve this purpose, 
“there is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view” of 
speech restrictions than when the speech is “likely to produce a clear and 
present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public 
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”111 Any other standard for restricting 
speech “would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, 
courts, or dominant political or community groups.”112 The Supreme 
Court later abandoned the “clear and present danger” test in favor of a test 
that asks whether the speech was “directed to inciting or producing 
 
majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly 
should be guaranteed. 
Id. at 375 (emphasis added). Political dissent is therefore an essential part of the process of 
reaching political truth and preventing tyranny by majorities acting on an imperfect 
formulation of political truth.  
 108. See THOREAU, supra note 36, at 261 (stating that “[t]he government itself, which 
is only the mode which the people have chosen to execute their will, is equally liable to be 
abused and perverted before the people can act through it,” Thoreau is recognizing that the 
majoritarian system of government is susceptible to tyranny through abuse and perversion); 
see also Letter from Birmingham Jail, supra note 40 (stating that “[t]hroughout Alabama all 
sorts of devious methods are used to prevent Negroes from becoming registered voters, 
and there are some counties in which, even though Negroes constitute a majority of the 
population, not a single Negro is registered,” Dr. King is recognizing that the government 
not only has the capacity for tyranny, but also the capacity for systematically perpetuating 
that tyranny). 
 109. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Terminiello v. 
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
 110. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4. While the Terminiello Court did not deal directly 
with the issue of whether the First Amendment can be the basis of a defense against 
criminal charges, its observations on the purpose of the First Amendment comport with 
Dr. King’s views on creating tension, namely that tension is necessary for growth. See 
Letter from Birmingham Jail, supra note 40.  
 111. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4 (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262 (1941); 
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947)).  
 112. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4–5. 
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imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”113 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has espoused principles mandating that 
to protect dissent and prevent “standardization of ideas,” speech must be 
given great protections that prevent the government from imposing its 
views on the unwilling.114  
In 1976, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he First Amendment 
affords the broadest protection to . . . political expression in order ‘to 
assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people.’”115 This stance reflected 
the “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”116 In 1989, the 
Supreme Court recognized that an individual’s “dissatisfaction with the 
policies of this country” is an “expression situated at the core of our First 
Amendment values.”117 In 2010, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that “[t]he 
First Amendment underwrites the freedom to experiment and to create in 
the realm of thought . . . . The civic discourse belongs to the people, and 
the Government may not prescribe the means used to conduct it.”118 Thus, 
the Supreme Court clearly upholds the notion that the First Amendment 
exists, at least in part, to protect political dissent from certain governmental 
actions, including a general dissatisfaction with the government’s policies.  
 
 113. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
 114. See Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4–5. 
 115. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Roth v. United States., 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).  
 116. Id. at 14 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). The 
Buckley Court goes on to note that freedom of speech extends to “‘vigorous advocacy.’” Id. 
at 48 (quoting N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 269). The Buckley Court also states: 
But the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of 
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to 
the First Amendment, which was designed “to secure ‘the widest possible 
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources . . . .’” 
Id. at 48–49 (quoting N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 266). 
 117. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411 (1989) (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 
318 (1988); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479 (1988)) (holding that burning the 
American flag in a public place is protected expression). Note how this conception of 
protected expression—one’s distaste for the general policies of the country — comports with 
Thoreau’s conception of a government act. Thoreau condemns “character and measures 
of a government.” THOREAU, supra note 36, at 268.  
 118. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 341 
(2003)) (recognizing that even though Citizens United overturned the central holding of 
McConnell, Justice Kennedy’s observations on the First Amendment from McConnell that 
he quotes and incorporates into the majority opinion of Citizen’s United are good law).  
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In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the Supreme Court 
recognizes that political dissent need not be purely speech. The Supreme 
Court has stated that the protection of the First Amendment “extends to 
more than abstract discussion, unrelated to action.”119 The Supreme Court 
has further declared that “‘[f]ree trade in ideas’ means free trade in the 
opportunity to persuade to action, not merely to describe facts.”120 The 
Supreme Court also has declared that the “freedom of speech and of 
assembly, and freedom to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances” are not “confined to verbal expression.”121 Indeed, the Court 
affirmatively noted that these rights “embrace appropriate types of 
action.”122 Accordingly, political dissent is not limited to speech alone, but 
may necessarily include appropriate action to enhance its impact.  
However, the Supreme Court is reluctant to expressly declare that 
such actions always consist of constitutionally protected expression. In 
1968, the Supreme Court stated that “[w]e cannot accept the view that an 
apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever 
the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”123 
Nonetheless, approximately twenty years later in Clark v. Community for 
Creative Non-Violence, the Supreme Court assumed, but did not 
expressly decide, that “overnight sleeping” in Lafayette Park (in 
connection with a demonstration calling attention to the issue of 
homelessness) was “expressive conduct protected to some extent by the 
 
 119. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945).  
 120. Id. (citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919)). The Collins Court states that “[w]hen 
to this persuasion other things are added which bring about coercion, or give it that 
character, the limit of the right has been passed.” Id. at 537–38. This is not incompatible 
with the principles of civil disobedience outlined here because while active disobedience 
may be geared toward persuasion to action, only in rare circumstances may it be 
considered coercive. Coercion implies the absence of choice. See Coercion, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “coercion” as “[c]ompulsion of a free agent by 
physical, moral, or economic force or threat of physical force”). Civil disobedience is 
inherently used by a minority against a government act. Only in extreme circumstances 
would an entire government be compelled to act by the “physical, moral, or economic 
force or threat” by an individual or minority group. See id. 
 121. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141–42 (1966).  
 122. Id. at 142. The Court noted that in the circumstances of the case, “appropriate 
types of action” included “the right in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest by silent 
and reproachful presence, in a place where the protestant has every right to be” to protest 
“the unconstitutional segregation of public facilities.” Id.  
 123. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).  
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First Amendment.”124 In addition, the Clark Court stated that “a message 
may be delivered by conduct that is intended to be communicative and 
that, in context, would reasonably be understood by the viewer to be 
communicative.”125 Therefore, for an act of civil disobedience to be 
protected expressive conduct, it must reasonably be understood to be 
communicative in its context.126 
B. The Supreme Court and Disobedience 
Alongside its recognition that political dissent merits protection, and 
that this dissent may necessarily include action, the Supreme Court has, at 
times, embraced acts of disobedience as a means to express political 
dissent. The Supreme Court has recognized that in a purely technical 
sense, disobedience may be necessary to challenge the constitutionality of 
a government action. In a draft-evasion case from 1953, the applicable 
draft statute made the classification orders by selective service authorities 
final, with no opportunity for judicial review.127 The Court recognized that 
under such a scheme, the only opportunity to review the constitutionality 
of any decision is after indictment for refusing to “submit to induction.”128 
This active disobedience is precisely what the plaintiff in the case resorted 
to so he could challenge his classification, and the Court accepted it as a 
necessary part of the process.129 
In another draft-evasion case from 1945, the Court went beyond 
technical recognition of active disobedience. It noted that actually evading 
the draft is criminal, but “to counsel merely refusal [to serve] is not made 
criminal” by the draft provisions.130 Later on, the Court emphatically 
declared:  
 
 124. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).  
 125. Id. at 294 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Tinker v. Des 
Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969)). 
 126. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11. For the purposes of the discussion presented 
below, the Clearwater County defendants are presumed to have met this additional 
requirement.. 
 127. Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 394 (1953) (holding that the courts 
may review draft-status classifications if there are insufficient facts from which to draw an 
inference that the classification was reasonable). 
 128. Id.  
 129. See id.  
 130. Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478, 487 (1945). Counseling against draft 
service may properly be construed as active disobedience against the draft, something the 
Supreme Court recognized is not criminal or at least is not as criminally culpable as actual 
draft evasion. Id. 
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One with innocent motives, who honestly believes a law is 
unconstitutional and, therefore, not obligatory, may well counsel 
that the law shall not be obeyed; that its command shall be 
resisted until a court shall have held it valid, but this is not 
knowingly counselling, stealthily and by guile, to evade its 
command.131 
Such a conception of active disobedience is necessary to avoid 
criminal prosecutions where defendants with “innocent motives” are 
placed in front of a jury who could not “reach any other than a verdict of 
guilty” because of the statutory scheme.132 Thus, the Supreme Court 
recognized that people taking action (counseling against draft service) 
against a government act (draft service provisions) that they honestly 
believed was unjust (“with innocent motives”) may not be given a jury 
instruction that prohibits the jury from taking those innocent motives into 
account. 
A 1965 civil rights case, where the Court considered a challenge to a 
conviction for breach of the peace in connection with a protest against 
segregated lunch counters, followed the same line of reasoning.133 The 
plaintiff, Cox, was the leader of a group of about two thousand students 
who gathered to protest the arrest of twenty-three students who previously 
protested against segregated lunch counters in Baton Rouge.134 Cox stated 
the protests were against “the evil of discrimination.”135 Cox was arrested 
for the following speech he gave at the end of the protest: 
All right. It’s lunch time. Let’s go eat. There are twelve stores we 
are protesting. A number of these stores have twenty counters; 
they accept your money from nineteen. They won’t accept it 
from the twentieth counter. This is an act of racial 
discrimination. These stores are open to the public. You are 
members of the public. We pay taxes to the Federal 
Government and you who live here pay taxes to the State.136 
 
 131. Id. at 493–94. Note how this comports with the means of determining if a 
governmental act is unjust, particularly Aquinas’s belief that individuals are not obligated to 
abide by unjust laws. See AQUINAS, supra note 30, at 1368.  
 132. Keegan, 325 U.S. at 494. 
 133. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 552 (1965) (holding that the breach of the peace 
statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because “[m]aintenance of the opportunity for free 
political discussion is a basic tenet of our constitutional democracy”).  
 134. Id. at 538–44.  
 135. Id. at 540.  
 136. Id. at 542–43.  
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According to the arresting officer, the conduct of the protesters 
became objectionable only when Cox “urged the students to go uptown 
and sit in at lunch counters.”137 The trial court convicted Cox of “an 
inherent breach of the peace” for the act of bringing the protesters into the 
city and encouraging them to sit at lunch counters.138 
In response to Cox’s conviction, the Supreme Court stated that 
“constitutional rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to their 
assertion or exercise.”139 Even more significant, the Court stated that the 
government may not “‘require all who wish to disseminate ideas to present 
them first to police authorities for their consideration and approval, with a 
discretion in the police to say some ideas may, while others may not, be . . 
. disseminate[d].’”140 Thus, the Court recognized that one who takes action 
 
 137. Id. at 546.  
 138. Id. at 550. The full reasoning of the trial court is as follows:  
[I]t must be recognized to be inherently dangerous and a breach of the peace 
to bring 1,500 people, colored people, down in the predominantly white 
business district in the City of Baton Rouge and congregate across the street 
from the courthouse and sing songs as described to me by the defendant as the 
CORE national anthem carrying lines such as “black and white together” and 
to urge those 1,500 people to descend upon our lunch counters and sit there 
until they are served. That has to be an inherent breach of the peace, and our 
statute 14:103.1 has made it so. 
Id. at 549–50. In the context of 1960s Baton Rouge, these actions may fairly be 
characterized as active disobedience.  
 139. Id. at 551 (quoting Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963)). 
 140. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557 (1965) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939)); see Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 
293–94 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 
U.S. 558, 559–60 (1948); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 422 (1943); Hague v. Comm. for 
Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450–51 
(1938). 
There are, of course, contrary viewpoints regarding the government’s ability to dictate time, 
place, and manner of political expression. Even the Cox Court recognized, in the context 
of blocking sidewalks, that:  
The rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic 
society, still do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may 
address a group at any public place and at any time. The constitutional 
guarantee of liberty implies the existence of an organized society maintaining 
public order, without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of 
anarchy. The control of travel on the streets is a clear example of 
governmental responsibility to insure this necessary order. A restriction in that 
relation, designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, and 
not susceptible to abuses of discriminatory application, cannot be disregarded 
by the attempted exercise of some civil right which, in other circumstances, 
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(organizing a protest of Black Americans in Jim Crow-era Baton Rouge 
and advocating sit-ins at lunch counters) against an unjust government act 
(de jure segregation) should not be punished simply because the 
authorities are hostile to his message, and indeed, that one does not need 
to seek the permission of the authorities to engage in this active 
disobedience.141  
In a more recent case affirming the right to burn the United States 
flag, the Court provided further justification for distinguishing valid 
disobedient conduct. In Texas v. Johnson, the Court provided for a means 
of determining when conduct is deemed expressive, stating that “[i]n 
deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative 
elements to” implicate the First Amendment, the Court must consider 
whether there is “an intent to convey a particularized message” and 
whether “the likelihood was great that the message would be understood 
by those who viewed it.”142  
Restrictions on expressive conduct are subject to strict scrutiny,143 
which requires that the restriction is “necessary to serve a compelling state 
 
would be entitled to protection. One would not be justified in ignoring the 
familiar red light because this was thought to be a means of social protest. Nor 
could one, contrary to traffic regulations, insist upon a street meeting in the 
middle of Times Square at the rush hour as a form of freedom of speech or 
assembly. 
Id. at 554–55. In addition, other opinions have stated that “[w]hen protest takes the form 
of mass demonstrations, parades, or picketing on public streets and sidewalks, the free 
passage of traffic and the prevention of public disorder and violence become important 
objects of legitimate state concern.” Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 316 (1967). The 
Supreme Court has also noted that “[c]ivil liberties . . . imply the existence of an organized 
society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of 
unrestrained abuses,” and that regulations to ensure the “safety and convenience” of the 
public is “one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which” the exercise of 
civil liberties depends. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941). However, these 
holdings are not inconsistent with the concept of civil disobedience as an appropriate 
criminal defense. Civil disobedience does not challenge the constitutionality of the 
regulation under which a person may be arrested for his or her active disobedience. 
Rather, civil disobedience, as properly applied, asserts that the person is constitutionally 
justified in their active disobedience. This is not asserting that time, place, and manner 
restrictions on speech are unconstitutional. Civil disobedience merely allows a 
decisionmaker to find that a person who is taking action against an unjust government act 
should only be nominally punished under those very regulations, if indeed the person is 
charged with violating them.  
 141. Cox, 379 U.S. at 557.  
 142. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 
U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974)). 
 143. Id. at 412 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)). 
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interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”144 By requiring a 
strict scrutiny standard, the Supreme Court acknowledges that conduct 
may be sufficiently expressive to implicate the First Amendment, and 
furthermore, that this conduct merits greater protection than other forms 
of conduct. However, the government is given greater leeway for content-
neutral restrictions on expressive conduct as long as the restrictions are 
unrelated to suppressing expression.145 Nonetheless, if active disobedience 
takes the form of particularly expressive conduct, such as flag burning 
protected by Johnson, the Supreme Court has stated such disobedience 
deserves greater protection.146  
C. Conclusion 
The First Amendment protects political dissent. Expressing 
displeasure with the general stances of the government is included under 
this protection. In addition, the Supreme Court recognizes that expressing 
political dissent does not require pure speech alone, but may include 
direct action.147 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
direct disobedience in protest of government actions may not be the basis 
of a criminal conviction.148 The Supreme Court also holds that content-
based restrictions on expressive conduct must pass greater constitutional 
scrutiny.149 Accordingly, there is ample support from Supreme Court 
jurisprudence for a principle that allows nominal punishment for actions 
in the vein of civil disobedience.  
IV. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE APPLIED TO AMERICAN JURISPRUDENTIAL 
PRINCIPLES 
Civil disobedience intersects most intimately with two established 
concepts of American law: criminal intent and the necessity defense . 
 
 144. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing 
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)). 
 145. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406–07. 
 146. See id. at 404; Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.  
 147. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141–42 (1966). 
 148. Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478, 487 (1945).  
 149. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412.  
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A. Civil Disobedience and Criminal Intent 
Punishment is based on principles of criminal liability.150 This 
includes both actus reus and mens rea.151 There are instances where a 
person may have committed the act without the intent to commit a 
crime.152 In these instances, no crime generally has been committed.153  
Defining criminal intent, however, is a difficult venture.154 It 
necessarily includes an element of “blameworthy or culpable conduct” 
accompanied by the “mental state necessary for the imposition of criminal 
liability.”155 Often, intent is defined by statute.156 New York, for example, 
defines criminal intent as follows: “[a] person acts intentionally with 
respect to a result or to conduct described by statute defining an offense 
when his conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage in such 
conduct.”157 Criminal intent thus relies on the objective to engage in the act 
itself, and if the act is defined as criminal, then the offender has committed 
a crime.  
Minnesota’s conception of criminal liability, as applied to the 
Clearwater County events, follows this line of reasoning. In Minnesota, 
“the legislature may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission 
criminal without regard to the intention, knowledge, or motive of the 
doer.”158 With regard to intent, “[i]t is not essential that the wrongdoer 
should intend to commit the crime to which his act amounts, but it is 
essential that he should intend to do the act which constitutes the crime.”159 
To find criminal intent in Minnesota, therefore, there must only be the 
 
 150. “In order to prove that a person is guilty of a crime, the prosecution must prove 
each and every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” 1 MCCLOSKEY, 
SCHOENBERG & SHAPIRO, CRIMINAL LAW DESKBOOK § 14.07 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 
2018).  
 151. Id. (“Generally, the prosecution must prove both a guilty act (actus reus) and a 
guilty state of mind (mens rea) in order to prove the crime.”). 
 152. Id. (“If injury is caused by accident, there is no crime because the actor lacks the 
requisite state of mental culpability.”). 
 153. See id.  
 154. 1 WITKIN ET AL., WITKIN CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW ELEMENTS § 2 (2018) 
(“Despite the universal acceptance of the principle that general criminal intent is required, 
it is impossible to frame an accurate and useful definition of the term ‘mens rea.’”). 
 155. Id. (noting that criminal intent “appears to refer not to a single, definite kind of 
intent, but rather to a number of different mental states, all of them involving some 
blameworthy element”). 
 156. See MCCLOSKEY, SCHOENBERG & SHAPIRO, supra note 150.  
 157. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(1)).  
 158. State v. Kremer, 262 Minn. 190, 191, 114 N.W.2d 88, 89 (1962). 
 159. Id.  
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intent to commit an act that constitutes a crime. This intent to commit an 
act that is deemed criminal, combined with the completion of the criminal 
act, results in criminal liability.160 
The civil disobedience conception described in this note is consistent 
with the notion of criminal intent. A person committing an act of civil 
disobedience is engaging in an intentional act. If this intentional act also is 
a crime, the basic element of criminal intent is satisfied.161 However, the 
intent underlying civil disobedience is more akin to where the injury is 
“caused by accident,” which would obviate criminal liability.162 The intent 
of civil disobedience is not to cause harm, but to draw attention to an 
unjust government act. While an act may be defined as criminal, the lack 
of intent to cause harm merits a defendant the opportunity to argue for 
decreased or nominal punishment. It also is important to stress that civil 
disobedience would not be used as a basis for acquittal, and thus would 
accept the necessity for punishment of acts committed with criminal intent. 
Therefore, civil disobedience is not inconsistent with the rule of law, 
because it would not completely obviate criminal liability, but would 
instead allow the punishment for criminal intent to be reduced in 
accordance with the lack of intent to cause harm.  
B. Civil Disobedience and Necessity 
The defense of necessity is available to mitigate the consequences of 
unlawful conduct, but is generally not available to mitigate the 
consequences of civil disobedience.163 Generally, there are three essential 
elements for the necessity defense, including: (1) the commission of an act 
“to prevent a significant and immediate evil” that arose without fault or 
causation by the actor, (2) there is no “reasonable or adequate legal 
alternative” for the act, and (3) the harm caused was not “disproportionate 
to the harm avoided.”164 The necessity defense thus “requires evidence of 
 
 160. See id.  
 161. See id.  
 162. See MCCLOSKEY, SCHOENBERG & SHAPIRO, supra note 150. 
 163. See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 135 (2019).  
 164. Id.; accord State v. Garrison, 171 P.3d 91, 94 (Alaska 2007) (reciting the 
elements of the necessity defense as: “(1) [defendant] committed the charged offense to 
prevent a significant evil; (2) there was no adequate alternative to the charged offense; and 
(3) the harm caused was not disproportionate to the harm [defendant] avoided by breaking 
the law”); see also U.S. v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410–11 (1980) (stating that the defendant 
must demonstrate that “given the imminence of the threat, violation of [the statute 
criminalizing escape from federal custody] was his only reasonable alternative” to be 
entitled to a “defense of duress or necessity”).  
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both immediate necessity and imminent harm”165 and that the defendant 
“acted out of necessity at all times that he or she engaged in the unlawful 
conduct.”166 
The main point of conflict between acts of civil disobedience and the 
necessity defense is that the necessity defense is generally unavailable “as 
an instrument for juror nullification of unpopular laws.”167 More 
specifically, necessity is generally unavailable “to excuse criminal activity by 
those who disagree with policies of the government.”168 The Court has 
noted that necessity, “[u]nder any definition,” has one constant principle: 
“if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law,” the 
defense will fail if the actor does not use that legal alternative.169 Therefore, 
acts of civil disobedience often do not fall under the protective province of 
the necessity defense. 
State courts have incorporated the Court’s holding and followed the 
rule that “if a reasonable legal alternative was available . . . as a means to 
avoid the threatened injury, [defendants] properly may be foreclosed from 
asserting a choice of evils defense.”170 Courts have explicitly said: “The 
necessity defense was never intended to excuse criminal activity by those 
who disagree with the decisions and policies of the lawmaking branches of 
government.”171 This conflicts with acts of civil disobedience because 
 
 165. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 135 (2019); see also Planned Parenthood of Mid-
Iowa v. Maki, 478 N.W.2d 637, 640 (Iowa 1991) (citation omitted) (the necessity defense 
applies “only in emergency situations where the threatened harm is immediate and the 
threatened disaster imminent.”); People v. Brandyberry, 812 P.2d 674, 677–79 (Colo. 
App. 1990) (citations omitted) (holding that “[e]vidence of a generalized fear of future 
injury is not sufficient to warrant the invocation of a choice of evils defense,” and that the 
evidence “must affirmatively demonstrate the existence of a specific threat or likelihood of 
an imminent injury necessitating the actor’s conduct”). 
 166. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 135. 
 167. Brandyberry, 812 P.2d at 677. 
 168. Planned Parenthood of Mid-Iowa, 478 N.W.2d at 640 (citing U.S. v. Kabat, 797 
F.2d 580, 591 (8th Cir. 1986)).  
 169.  U.S. v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980).  
 170. Brandyberry, 812 P.2d at 679 (citing Bailey, 444 U.S. at 410; People v. 
Hocquard, 236 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975)).  
 171. Kabat, 797 F.2d at 591; accord U.S. v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 432 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(stating that the availability of “recourse to the political process” to address the defendant’s 
concerns on the country’s nuclear policy made the necessity defense unavailable). The 
Kabat court also indicated that if a court were to allow the necessity defense, it would 
essentially be saying “the ‘greater harm’ sought to be prevented” is the “course of action 
chosen by elected representatives.” 797 F.2d at 591. Negative policy judgments implying 
that the elected representatives are incorrect “are not the province of judge (or jury) under 
the separation of powers established by our Constitution.” Id. at 591–92.  
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disobedience against a government action does not necessarily require that 
all other political avenues to express displeasure with the government 
action be exhausted.172 The necessity defense is thus unavailable in most 
instances where civil disobedience would be necessary. This leaves 
individuals who meet the criteria for civil disobedience with the prospect 
of not voicing their political dissent at all for fear of punishment—a 
prospect that has been deemed unconstitutional.173  
C. Conclusion 
Civil disobedience is compatible with two areas of American 
jurisprudence with which it could be construed to be in conflict. First, civil 
disobedience is in accord with notions of criminal intent because it merely 
provides an opportunity for lessened punishment, not a means to 
completely avoid punishment for acts that may be defined as criminal. 
Second, civil disobedience is necessary to fill the gaps left by the necessity 
defense. It will allow necessary protection for instances of persons acting 
on their genuinely held political dissent where the only inference to be 
drawn by a jury is that they are guilty simply because there is no other 
defense available.174 This would be an unconstitutional restriction on 
political expression, a restriction that civil disobedience helps alleviate. 
 
Under the doctrine of civil disobedience outlined herein, there is no danger of reaching 
such a negative policy judgment. The court allowing the defense is recognizing that the 
individual believes that the government act is wrong and is merely giving that individual the 
opportunity to be heard. If the objective criteria are met, the judge allows the defense to be 
presented. The only judgments the court need make are those relating to the individual’s 
objective belief that the government was unjust and active disobedience was necessary. This 
involves no policy judgment by the judge regarding that government act.  
 172. Aquinas notes that refusal to obey an unjust law may be done without prior 
attempts to change that law. AQUINAS, supra note 30, at 1368 (of course, in Aquinas’s day, 
the ordinary citizen had little recourse to the political process to effect such change, and so 
an ordinary necessity defense might have sufficed). Thoreau explicitly disavows the political 
process. THOREAU, supra note 36, at 266 (noting that even voting for what one thinks is 
right is “doing nothing” to advance what is right). Dr. King similarly believes that the 
political process is insufficient. Letter from Birmingham Jail, supra note 40. 
 173. See Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478, 494 (1945). 
 174. See id.  
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V. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE DEFENSE APPLIED TO STATE V. KLAPSTEIN 
A. The Clearwater County Defendants and the Necessity Defense 
Minnesota does not recognize civil disobedience as an independent 
defense. It follows the rest of the nation in allowing necessity as a defense, 
but not when the political system is ostensibly available to redress the 
grievance.175 The necessity defense in Minnesota consists of three 
elements: “(1) there is no legal alternative to breaking the law, (2) the harm 
to be prevented is imminent, and (3) there is a direct, causal connection 
between breaking the law and preventing the harm.”176 
Nonetheless, the Clearwater County defendants prepared a necessity 
defense for their arguments to the district court, which the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals concluded they should be afforded an opportunity to 
present at trial.177 Defendants argued on appeal that they met the prima 
facie elements of the defense, and refusal of the opportunity to assert a 
necessity defense would deprive them of their constitutional right to make 
a defense.178 The Minnesota Court of Appeals refused to reverse the 
district court’s order because the state failed to demonstrate that 
presentation of a necessity defense would have a “critical impact” on the 
case.179 However, on October 5, 2018, the district court excluded the 
Defendants’ proffered expert testimony regarding climate change and the 
need for civil disobedience from trial.180 
Ultimately, the Clearwater County defendants won their case without 
the necessity defense because the district court granted their motion for a 
 
 175. State v. Rein, 477 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (citing U.S. v. 
Schoon, 939 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 1991)) (noting that the necessity defense is unavailable 
where legal remedies are present, and citing with approval a Ninth Circuit decision holding 
as a matter of law “the necessity defense is unavailable regarding acts of indirect civil 
disobedience”).  
 176. Id. at 717 (citing U.S. v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270, 1270 (10th Cir. 1982)).  
 177. See State v. Klapstein, No. 15-CR-16-413, 2018 WL 1902473, at *1 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Apr. 23, 2018), cert. denied (July 17, 2018).  
 178. Respondents’ Pretrial Appeal Brief and Addendum at 7–8, State v. Klapstein, 
No. 15-CR-16-414 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2018) [hereinafter Respondents’ Brief]. 
 179. State v. Klapstein, No. 15-CR-16-413, 2018 WL 1902473, at *3. This decision 
also produced a vehement dissent advocating that under Rein, there is no necessity defense 
available for defendants such as the Clearwater County defendants, because they had legal 
alternatives, the harm was not imminent, and there was no direct causal connection 
between their actions and the harm sought to be averted. Id. at *3–5 (Connolly, J., 
dissenting).  
 180. Defendants’ Memorandum at 1, State v. Klapstein, No. 15-CR-16-413, 2018 WL 
1902473, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2018), review denied (July 17, 2018). 
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directed judgment of acquittal on the grounds that the state had not proven 
that they had “caused criminal damage to the pipelines.”181 Nevertheless, 
the arguments that the Clearwater County defendants provided and 
intended to provide in support of the necessity defense are useful vehicles 
for evaluating how the proposed civil disobedience defense could be 
applied.  
B. Civil Disobedience Instead of Necessity 
While necessity is an affirmative defense to criminal liability, civil 
disobedience is a defense made to reduce or nullify sentencing. Therefore, 
a properly asserted defense of civil disobedience would essentially admit 
criminal liability to focus on the sentencing. This may result in a criminal 
proceeding focused solely on the issue of sentencing, such as a guilty plea 
followed by an evidentiary sentencing hearing. With this procedural 
framework in mind, it is apparent that the Clearwater County defendants 
could make a sufficient showing of each element of civil disobedience to 
significantly reduce or even receive nominal punishment.  
 1.  An Act of Government  
The government act at issue in Klapstein was the government’s stance 
on climate change and the lack of effective action taken to prevent it or 
mitigate its effects.182 A government act may include the laws, the system by 
which those laws are created, how those laws are enforced, and the general 
stances of the government enforcing the laws.183  
The Clearwater County defendants asserted that “years of political 
engagement by themselves and their allies” had failed to provoke effective 
action.184 They clearly expressed a frustration with the current political 
system that was perpetuating inaction on the issue of climate change, if not 
with the general stance of the current government on climate change. This 
comports with both Thoreau’s and Dr. King’s conceptions of the 
government act. Thoreau took issue with the general stances of the 
American government on the issues of slavery and the war in Mexico.185 
Dr. King took issue with a system of government that was being 
manipulated to prevent change, as well as the means of enforcement that 
 
 181. Kraker, Pipeline Country, supra note 6. 
 182. Klapstein, 2018 WL 1902473, at *1. 
 183. See supra Part II.A. 
 184. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 178, at 6.  
 185. THOREAU, supra note 36.  
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helped to perpetuate injustice.186 The existing political system that 
perpetuates a policy of relative inaction on the issue of climate change 
could fairly be characterized as the government act for purposes of 
establishing the first element of civil disobedience as outlined herein.  
 2. That is Unjust 
To show that this political system is unjust requires that (1) it violates 
the conscience of the individual defendants, and (2) it has the effect of 
harming those it is applied against.187 
The Clearwater County defendants made a showing that government 
intractability on climate change violates their personal and collective 
consciences. They detailed their extensive and documented opposition to 
climate change.188 This evidence, both testamentary and documentary in 
the form of court filings, letters to legislators, and petitions, could have 
satisfied the burden of proving that inaction on climate change violates the 
consciences of all the Clearwater County defendants. 
The issue of proving harm as it relates to climate change could have 
proven less manageable. Harm, as applied in the civil disobedience 
context, is distinct from harm as applied in the necessity defense context 
 
 186. Letter from Birmingham Jail, supra note 40. 
 187. See supra Part II.B. 
 188. The brief reports: 
Annette Klapstein, a retired attorney, noted that she has “testified at dozens of 
hearings,” that she and fellow activists “systematically wrote to every single 
legislative representative we had at the city level, at the county level, at the state 
level, at the federal level and asked them to meet with us to discuss what they 
were going to do to resolve the climate change issue,” and that she has signed 
hundreds of petitions and participated in dozens of marches and rallies. (Tr. at 
12-14). Emily Johnston described co-founding an environmental group that 
did “everything from education to lobbying to protests, and occasionally direct 
action,” as well as “actual research and . . . turning people out to hearings, 
helping people figure out what to say at hearings.” (Tr. at 31-33). Ben 
Joldersma testified that he has attended many marches and protests, and that 
his activism has involved “organizing actions, . . . helping plan . . . affinity 
groups, . . . working with media, social media trying to help amplify the effect 
of the actions.” (Tr. at 54). Steven Liptay noted that he has worked as a 
videographer and support worker with environmental organizations in order to 
inspire people to take action. (Tr. at 63-65). 
Respondents’ Brief, supra note 178, at 19.  
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(which generally requires that harm be imminent).189 For civil 
disobedience, it may be sufficient to demonstrate that harm either has 
already occurred as a result of the government act, or that harm is likely to 
occur in the future if the government act continues unabated.190 
The Clearwater County defendants made an ample and credible 
showing of the harm that will result if government inaction on climate 
change is allowed to continue unchallenged. They asserted multiple times 
the “enormous and long-lasting harms of global climate change.”191 Emily 
Johnston testified that “[i]f these pipelines are not shut off, it is absolutely 
the end of a stable climate and the world as we know it.”192 The Clearwater 
County defendants also presented expert testimony from the “Director of 
the Climate Science, Awareness, and Solutions program at the Earth 
Institute” at Columbia University, who was also previously the Director of 
the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies: 
[G]lobal warming from persistent high fossil fuel emissions is in 
the danger zone, that CO2 [carbon dioxide] emissions from all 
such sources must be reduced with all deliberate speed, that the 
situation is becoming worse with each passing day, and that we 
are likely approaching climate tipping points from which there is 
no reasonable prospect of return.193 
In addition, the Clearwater County defendants cited evidence of 
detrimental effects on shorelines, the economy, wildlife, human 
populations, and agriculture.194 The Clearwater County defendants 
planned to introduce evidence at trial demonstrating the detrimental 
health impacts of climate change, including “cancer, heart diseases, lung 
diseases, neurological disorders including stroke and cognitive decline, 
infectious diseases, developmental disorders, allergies, malnutrition, and 
mental illness.”195 While most likely sufficient on its own, this evidence 
could have been supplemented by further studies that demonstrated more 
 
 189. Necessity applies where the harm is “instant, overwhelming, and leaves no 
alternative but the conduct in question.” State v. Johnson, 289 Minn. 196, 198, 183 
N.W.2d 541, 543 (1971). 
 190. Consider Dr. King’s use of the threat of continued feelings of inferiority coupled 
with the demonstrated physical harm to civil rights protesters as part of his argument why 
segregation is unjust. Letter from Birmingham Jail, supra note 40. 
 191. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 178, at 16.  
 192. Id. at 26 (alteration in original).  
 193. Id. at 17.  
 194. Id. at 17–18.  
 195. Declaration of Bruce Snyder, MD, at 3, State v. Klapstein, No. 15-CR-16-414 
(Sept. 3, 2018). 
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particularized impacts on human health.196 With this evidence on hand, it 
is more than likely that the Clearwater County defendants could have 
carried the burden of establishing the requisite harm to show that the 
government act was unjust. This, coupled with the clear evidence of how 
the government act violates the conscience of these individuals, would 
have been enough to establish the second element of civil disobedience.  
 3. That Necessitates Active Disobedience 
Active disobedience is necessary when the governmental acts cause 
harm and formal redress is unavailable. As previously noted, the 
Clearwater County defendants made an adequate showing of harm. The 
Clearwater County defendants also made an adequate showing of the lack 
of formal redress. However, the third element of civil disobedience is not 
automatically satisfied upon an adequate showing of the first two elements. 
In this case, in order to show that the government act was a lack of action 
about a certain issue, the defendants needed to affirmatively demonstrate 
that lack of governmental action. If this were not necessary, that evidence 
would be presented with the third element to prove lack of formal 
redress.197 
In addition, while the Clearwater County defendants demonstrated 
sufficient harm to establish that the government act is unjust, it may have 
taken additional evidence relating to harm to prove that civil disobedience 
was necessary. This may have included evidence that time was running out 
to alleviate the threatened harm from global climate change. The 
Clearwater County defendants alleged that the Supreme Court has 
recognized that harm relating to climate change is imminent.198 They also 
 
 196. See generally NAT’L INST. OF ENVTL. HEALTH SCI’S, CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
HUMAN 
HEALTH (Apr. 2016) https://www.niehs.nih.gov/health/materials/climate_change_and_hum
an_health_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/49BU-RV3K]; A.J. MCMICHAEL ET AL., WORLD 




 197. The evidence provided by the Clearwater County defendants relating to the lack 
of formal redress includes delineating the efforts they each have made in opposition to 
climate change. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 178, at 19. Additionally, their evidence 
showed that “legal remedies ha[d] proven” to be ineffective due to outsized influence of 
business interests and especially the fossil fuel industry. Id. at 20.  
 198. Id. at 22 (citing Massachusetts. v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007) (for the 
proposition that the refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions was “an ‘imminent’ harm 
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cited extensive testimony from their expert that time is of the essence 
when it comes to action on climate change.199 This evidence could have 
been supplemented with reports stating that there are less than a dozen 
years left before humans can no longer reverse climate change to show 
that active disobedience was necessary, because soon it would be too late 
to act at all.200  
Evidence of a lack of formal redress for the injury of the type the 
Clearwater County defendants needed to show for the first element also 
will satisfy the third element of civil disobedience. In addition, evidence of 
harm coupled with evidence of urgency will satisfy the burden of proving 
that civil disobedience was necessary. If both of these are shown by 
sufficient evidence, then the third and final element of civil disobedience 
has been demonstrated. 
 4. The Decision 
Once sufficient evidence has been shown to support all three 
elements of civil disobedience, whether in the form of a defense at trial or 
an argument at a hearing, it is up to the decisionmaker to determine if the 
proffered evidence outweighs the criminal liability.201 There may indeed be 
 
to Massachusetts in light of the wealth of negative effects, including sea level rise, that result 
from climate change”)). 
 199. Id. at 23–24. 
 200. See, e.g., Christopher Joyce, Climate Report Warns of Extreme Weather, 
Displacement of Millions Without Action, NPR NEWS (Oct. 8, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/08/655360909/grim-forecast-from-u-n-on-global-climate-
change [https://perma.cc/3LVF-44EF]; Chris Mooney & Brady Dennis, The World Has 
Just Over a Decade to Get Climate Change Under Control, U.N. Scientists Say, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/energy-
environment/2018/10/08/world-has-only-years-get-climate-change-under-control-un-
scientists-say [https://perma.cc/65UQ-FTH7]; Jonathan Watts, We Have 12 Years to Limit 
Climate Change Catastrophe, Warns UN, GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/08/global-warming-must-not-exceed-
15c-warns-landmark-un-report [https://perma.cc/2VKW-9KA5]). 
 201. It is at this point that an affirmative defense of civil disobedience may run afoul of 
presumptive or mandated sentences pursuant to a jurisdiction’s sentencing guidelines. By 
way of example, the State of Minnesota’s sentencing guidelines govern the sentencing of 
felonies but allow departures from the guidelines if there exist “identifiable, substantial, and 
compelling circumstances to support a departure.” MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
COMM’N, MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY 38 (2018), 
https://mn.gov/sentencing-guidelines/guidelines/currentguidelines.jsp 
[https://perma.cc/6TEN-T5WQ]. However, these factors are “advisory,” and departures 
are constrained where “otherwise established by case law” and statute. Id. at 39. If not 
otherwise prohibited by statute or case law in the State of Minnesota, a judge departing 
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instances where the chosen method of active disobedience carries such 
connotations of criminality that criminal liability may overcome the 
proffered defense.202  
If, however, the proffered defense outweighs the criminal 
connotations of one’s conduct, then the decisionmaker may decide to 
reduce the severity of punishment. This can take many forms, depending 
on the weight of the evidence. For example, a decisionmaker could reduce 
a felony to a misdemeanor, or reduce jail time to probation. However, 
civil disobedience is fundamentally not a means to obviate criminal liability 
altogether. Therefore, in extreme circumstances of a great injustice, the 
decisionmaker will find the defendant guilty, but may simply refuse to 
mete out punishment. Whatever the result, it must be concomitant with 
the credibility of the evidence, and must not be based on whether the 
decisionmaker agrees or disagrees with the defendant’s personal views. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Constitution respects a citizen’s right to disagree with the 
government. The First Amendment serves as a means to protect and 
encourage political dissent. This extends beyond pure speech. The 
Supreme Court also has recognized that disobedience is sometimes 
necessary as a means of expressing political dissent, and that in these 
instances, the disobedient actor must be protected.  
The current means of protecting those who take disobedient action 
to express their political dissent are inadequate. The defense of necessity is 
more often than not unavailable to those who at least ostensibly have 
access to legal and political courses of action. This leaves a significant gap 
where those who have either attempted to evoke change through the 
political process and have been thwarted, or who objectively believe in the 
futility of the political process, unprotected if they try to exercise their 
 
from the guidelines by reason of civil disobedience must “disclose in writing or on the 
record the particular substantial and compelling circumstances that make the departure 
more appropriate than the presumptive sentence.” Id. Therefore, before defendants seek 
to assert a defense of civil disobedience, they must determine whether the crime they are 
charged with is governed by sentencing guidelines, whether departures to those guidelines 
are permitted, and what must be done to secure a departure from the guidelines, if 
necessary. An alternative option for proponents of civil disobedience as a recognized 
defense is to petition the legislature or the responsible agency in their jurisdiction to directly 
create an exception for civil disobedience. 
 202. An example would be if an individual resorts to violence or wanton destruction of 
property as their method of active disobedience.  
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constitutional right to express their political dissent. This is why civil 
disobedience as a basis to reduce sentencing for crimes is necessary. 
The elements of such a defense are that (1) there is a government 
action, (2) that is unjust, and (3) that necessitates active disobedience. 
“Government action” may include the laws, the system by which those 
laws are created, how those laws are enforced, and the general stances of 
the government enforcing the laws. Government acts are unjust when (1) 
they violate the individual’s conscience, and (2) harm those they are 
applied against. Government acts necessitate active disobedience to cause 
change when the governmental acts are causing harm and formal redress is 
unavailable. 
The case from Clearwater County is an example of how this defense 
may be asserted. Even though the defendants were presented the 
opportunity to make an argument for necessity, they also could have 
asserted a civil disobedience defense. This would have allowed them 
greater protection for expressing their political dissent, for if the necessity 
defense fails, then civil disobedience is available to reduce sentencing once 
criminal liability has been established. 
Civil disobedience as a defense that may be asserted to reduce or 
eliminate sentencing is not only constitutionally mandated, but is judicially 
manageable as well. It is inexcusable to continue to suppress expressions 
of political dissent when such a defense may be implemented. 
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